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Abstract

The concept of human agency refers to whether or not free will exists. Over the
course of history, several philosophers and psychologists have debated this particular
topic. As a result, three divergent schools of thought have emerged. One such school
posits the doctrine of free will; another articulates the doctrine of determinism. Still
another school of thought holds that free will and determinism cannot exist outside of
one another. This concept is called compatibilism. Human agency is a necessary
contextualization for the scope of the present study. While the debate of human
agency has not been fully resolved, this study is concerned with the implications of
the belief in agency. Individual belief in free will is referred to as sense of agency.
Researchers have indicated that the mere belief in free will or determinism produces
cognitive and behavioral effects. A higher belief in free will is correlated with
positive cognitive benefits and prosocial behaviors. A diminished sense of agency is
correlated with negative cognitive effects and antisocial behaviors. The present study
seeks to determine if sense of agency could be primed and subsequently enhanced. If
enhanced, the study seeks to determine if a heightened belief in free will leads to an
increased exhibition of prosocial behaviors. The present study included the
participation of 130 individuals. No significant data was found.
Keywords: free will, determinism, sense of agency, prosocial behaviors
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SENSE OF AGENCY
Sense of Agency and the Exhibition Prosocial Behaviors
Philosophers have often debated the notion of whether or not human beings
possess and exercise free will. Free will has been defined as the idea that human
beings possess the capability to control the course of their lives through their own
thoughts and actions (Feldman, 2017). Alternatively, those on the opposite side of
this debate hold the belief that humans are in fact subject to the doctrine of
determinism. Determinism is characterized by the idea that “every event or action,
including human action is the inevitable result of preceding events and actions and
the laws of nature” (Caruso, 2016, p.1). Although this was originally a debate
between schools of philosophy in antiquity, over time psychology has become
intermittently intertwined with the idea of free will. When examining this question,
however, psychologists have typically sought to determine not whether human
agency exists, but rather the empirical implications of the belief in free will.
Psychological researchers have shown that the mere belief or disbelief in the
subject of free will powerfully influences human behavior and cognition.
Contemporary researchers have indicated that a greater belief in determinism has
been correlated with undesirable social behavior. For example, researchers have
suggested that disbelief in “free will led to an increase in aggression and a reduction
in willingness to help” (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009, p. 267). Such a
conclusion stems from the notion that a lack of free will belief ultimately reduces
motivation and effort in an individual. Conversely, a higher belief in free will has
been shown to produce prosocial behavior in humans. Additionally, a variety of
cognitive benefits have also been associated with a higher sense of agency

5

SENSE OF AGENCY

6

(Baumeister & Brewer 2012; Clark et al., 2014; Moore, 2016). Such cognitive
benefits include higher self-efficacy and attributions of moral responsibility. Evidence
from Baumeister & Brewer (2012) indicated that high free will belief is “correlated
with finding life as more meaningful, with higher life satisfaction” (p. 8). Ultimately,
it appears there is an inherent correlation between sense of agency and humanistic
behaviors and cognitions.
Based upon my review of the current research, there is a gap in the literature.
The current research suggests that a higher disbelief in sense of agency typically leads
to antisocial behaviors. Conversely, researchers have indicated that an increased sense
of agency has led to the exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Cognitive benefits have
also been linked to this enhanced sense of agency. As a result, because this
correlation exists, sense of agency could help engender prosocial behaviors, while at
the same time reducing antisocial behaviors. Such a correlation could potentially
produce significant impacts for the improvement of society and individual cognitions.
Aarts & Van den Bos (2011) posited that evidence of free will belief inherently
primes individual sense of agency. However, beyond this experiment, researchers
have largely neglected any attempt at enhancing free will belief. While the
contemporary psychological research illustrates such an association between human
agency and behavior, a gap exists wherein the enhancement of sense of agency, and
its resulting correlates, has been under researched. As a result, the corresponding
question to the present study is whether sense of agency can be enhanced and, if so,
whether it results in increased manifestation of prosocial behaviors.
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The hypotheses associated with this study, labeled as H1 and H2, are as
follows:


H1: Individual sense of agency possesses the potential to be primed and
subsequently enhanced.



H2: Enhanced sense of agency will ultimately increase the exhibition of
prosocial behaviors, as seen in individuals in the experimental group
compared to the control group.

To examine these hypotheses, an experimental study was conducted that contained
two experimental conditions and one control condition. All participants completed a
pre/post questionnaire measuring their sense of agency. Between these measures,
participants read a vignette that was altered in accordance with the group to which
they were randomly assigned. After the completion of the post questionnaire,
individuals were provided an opportunity to participate in an act of prosocial
behavior. Immediately subsequent to the post-questionnaire, through means of
deception, this opportunity was introduced through an online invitation to participate
in a volunteer opportunity outside the scope of this study. The exhibition of the
behavior (i.e., agreeing to participate in the prosocial act) determined the validity of
the hypothesis.
Literature Review
Philosophers and psychologists have continually engaged in debate
concerning the existence of human agency. Human agency refers to the idea that an
individual has the capacity to act independently from external influences and to
control their choices based on free will. From this overarching debate, multiple
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schools of thought and theorists have emerged. One such school contains doctrines of
free will, which presupposes that humans have direct influence over their choices.
Within this particular domain, Immanuel Kant and Carl Rogers produced theories in
an effort to provide evidence for the existence of human agency. Opposite to this
sphere of thought is the school of determinism. Determinism posits that humans are
subject to external forces and do not have influence over their choices. Baruch
Spinoza and B.F. Skinner espoused doctrines of determinism within their respective
fields of practice. Finally, a third school developed that argued that free will and
determinism exist simultaneously. This field, known as compatibilism, has
experienced recognition due to the influence of existentialists such as Friedrich
Nietzsche, Ludwig Binswanger, and Medard Boss.
Theories regarding the existence of human agency are imperative for the
contextualization of human sense of agency. Doctrines concerning the existence of
human agency have influenced and provided a basis for the construction of the
concept of individual sense of agency. Sense of agency refers to individual belief in
the concept of free will. Contemporary researchers have built upon the original debate
and focused on both the cognitive and behavioral effects of belief in free will.
Individuals who possess greater levels of sense of agency typically experience
positive cognitive effects. In addition, these individuals display a heightened
exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Conversely, lower levels of sense of agency are
correlated with negative cognitive effects and antisocial behaviors. As a result,
priming and enhancing levels of sense of agency possesses the capacity to benefit
both the individual and the collective. In the pages that follow, both the doctrines
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related to agency and the psychological construct of the sense of agency will be fully
explored.
Doctrines of Free Will
Historically, a variety of philosophers have produced theories espousing
doctrines of free will. Immanuel Kant systematically constructed an argument
advocating human agency (Kant, 1972, 2013). Such advocacy fundamentally relied
upon certain ontological and epistemological considerations. When considering the
notion of metaphysics, Kant argued for two ontologically distinct categories, the
phenomenal and the noumenal (Kant, 2013). The phenomenal world encompasses
elements that appear to humans insofar as they are perceivers. Conversely, the
noumenal world represents elements as they are in themselves, as they exist
independently of how they appear (Yu, 2011). Humans, as a result of the existence of
these two categories, naturally exist in a state of duality. Stemming from such
metaphysics, Kant substantiated his epistemology through reason and cognitive
faculties. As in the case of Kantian metaphysics, a duality is consequently established
for the explication of human knowledge. Knowledge, according to Kant, is derived
through two divergent manners. Humans possess the ability to attain knowledge
through a posteriori and a priori means. A posteriori is empiricist in nature and
asserts that knowledge is known dependent upon experience. However, Kant
additionally argued from a rationalist perspective that certain knowledge is known a
priori, independent of individual experience (Hanna, 2016; Kant, 2013).
Based upon such metaphysical and epistemological foundations, Kant
consequently sought to establish a basis for human freedom. Human free will, as Kant
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argued, could not exist in the phenomenal realm. All natural events in this world were
subject to deterministic causes. As a result, freedom must necessarily exist as a
transcendental idea in the objective noumenal world. According to Kant, contained
within this noumenal world is an intuitively accepted “fact of reason” that humans are
subject to an axiom of morality (Kant, 1997). Morality, as a concept, inherently
presupposes the determination of reason and consequently implicates humans as
rational beings. Rational agents, as in the case of humans, are implicitly conscious of
the binding laws of morality (Cureton & Johnson, 2016; Kant, 1972). Kant argued
that such morality consists in and ultimately depends upon the faculty of reason.
Without the assumption of freedom, however, reason is ultimately unable to act.
When considering the concept of reason, freedom inherently represents an
indispensible practical function. As a result, rational beings possess an unavoidable
interest in thinking of themselves as free through reason. The ability to perform
judgments and apply reason systematically elevates rational beings outside the realm
of determinism (Kant 1972). Analysis of Kant’s argument reveals that the implicit
awareness of morality produces implications of rationality, which implies free will.
Thus, according to Kant, humans cannot exhibit rational functioning and possess
moral capacities without freedom.
Immanuel Kant produced theories that fundamentally represent the
philosophical underpinnings of free will. Psychologists, such as Carl Rogers,
eventually became intimately involved in this philosophical consideration. This
psychological involvement emerged out of the observation that human cognition and
perception can influence the philosophical debate. Originally, two branches of
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psychology dominated the entire field. These two primary branches, behaviorism and
psychoanalysis, were intimately influenced by deterministic perceptions and
approaches (Mounier et al., 2015). Both schools explicated the notion that humans
were subject to external forces outside of individual control. Eventually, this
deterministic dominance sparked the emergence and subsequent movement of a new
school of thought, humanistic psychology. In stark contrast to previous schools,
humanism emerged to explicate the freedom of humans. Humanists believed that both
psychoanalytic and behavioral schools neglected the conscious existence of
individuals. Behaviorism was perceived as mechanistic, while psychoanalysis
appeared reductionist in nature (Mounier et al., 2015). As a result of these beliefs,
humanistic psychologists sought to establish the principle that humans were unique
beings who possess awareness. This is manifested in the form of human
consciousness (Greening, 2006). Consequently, humanism is characterized by a focus
on individual growth and potential. Such a conscious desire for fulfillment and
growth functionally illustrates behavioral motivations. These motivations inherently
suggest that humans possess personal agency that arises through intentionality and
choice. As a result, humans utilize the notion of free will to achieve full potential as
rational beings.
Carl Rogers is considered the most influential figure in humanistic
psychology. His theory deals primarily with the development of personality in
individuals (Rogers, 1959). This development of personality, however, systematically
relies on and substantiates the philosophical consideration of free will. Such
establishment develops primarily through structural and motivational constructs.
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Analysis of Roger’s theory reveals that human experiences exist principally in what
he calls the phenomenal field (Rogers, 1959). The phenomenal field encompasses all
that is experienced by the organism, whether or not consciously perceived. Rogers
identified the self as a conscious aspect of the phenomenal field, which comprises all
aspects of experiences and being that exist in individual awareness (Pescitelli, 1996).
This self-concept is never complete and exists in a constant state of growth. As a
result, evaluation of this self-concept develops a consistent underlying motivational
construct. Humans, according to Rogers, possess an innate disposition towards an
actualizing tendency (Rogers, 1959). The actualizing tendency is characterized by the
desire to fulfill one’s potential and align with the organismic self. “All living
organisms strive to maintain, further, and actualize their experience” (Mueller, 2017a,
slide 11). As a result, behavior does not deterministically occur due to the past.
Rather, behavior is facilitated by the inclination to embody how one perceives
themself to exist. According to Rogers, such a tendency is naturally directional and is
an outward movement towards inherent autonomy, as the awareness of self and the
motivation for growth to achieve one’s potential ultimately act as a presupposition to
free will.
When considering the debate concerning the existence of human agency, free
will encompasses a prominent school of thought. Free will is the idea that individuals
possess the capacity to control their choices and have direct influence over the
environment around. Immanuel Kant and Carl Rogers represent two theorists who
posit doctrines of free will in their respective fields. From a philosophical perspective,
Kant argued for free will primarily on account of ontological and epistemological
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considerations. Due to the human faculty of reason, Kant argues that human agency
must necessarily exist. Psychologically, Rogers claimed the existence of free will
through the establishment of structural and motivational constructs in human
personality. Individual awareness and the actualizing tendency illustrate these
assertions by Rogers. Kant and Rogers ultimately represent advocates of human
agency albeit from two independent domains of influence.
Doctrines of Determinism
It is evident that multiple theories were developed in an attempt to prove the
philosophical assumption of free will. Two theories of free will, articulated by Kant
and Rogers, have been explored. Due to the exposition of theories on free will,
deterministic considerations arose in an effort to refute the concept of human
freedom. Baruch Spinoza fundamentally disagreed with the theoretical assumptions
of freedom and consequently posited the existence of determinism. Such propositions
emerged and relied upon metaphysical characteristics. For Spinoza, everything in
existence possessed the property of being either a substance or a mode (Spinoza,
2009). A substance is characterized as something that exists independently and does
not need anything to subsist. Conversely, a mode is a property, which needs a
substance to exist (Astore, 2016). Previous theorists articulated the notion that
substances were abundant throughout the universe. Spinoza, however, rejected this
traditional view and contended that God, also identified as nature, is the only
substance (Spinoza, 2009).
The establishment of substance monism represents the fundamental basis of
Spinoza’s argument for determinism. According to Spinoza, in order for an entity to
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be considered free, the being must exist solely by the necessity of its own nature
(Spinoza, 2009). In addition, the actions of the entity must be determined by itself
alone. Spinoza contended that except in the case of God, no substance could be
conceived. God represents the only conception of causa sui, something engendered
through itself (Spinoza, 2009). As a result of this substance monism, the claim that
one infinite substance is the only substance that exists, a certain brand of immanence
is inevitably created (Sandum, 2012). God consequently functions as a necessity for
the existence of all entities. Due to the fact that everything ultimately stems from
God, the current casual order of events represents the only possible order. These
metaphysical doctrines thus establish a high degree of causal determination.
Ontologically, humans exist outside of duality and as an intimate extension of God.
This extension places humans within the constraints of nature and the governance of
the laws of mind and body (Kisner, 2011). These attributes are in effect subject to the
previously established causal determination. “Men believe themselves to be free
because they are conscious of their own actions and are ignorant of the causes by
which they are determined” (Lord, 2010, p. 82). Ultimately, for Spinoza, it is
impossible for humans to exhibit free will, and the properties of determinism must
remain in full effect (Spinoza, 2009). Accordingly, the sense of free will is an
epiphenomenon of consciousness of one’s own acts, but not a reality in itself.
Upon analysis of psychological models consistent with Spinoza’s
deterministic philosophical framework, behaviorism appears as a preeminent branch.
Fundamentally, behaviorism is a theory that relies on a principle of stimulus and
response. All motivations and subsequent behaviors could thus be reduced to simple
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associations. Proponents of behaviorism, in its radical form at least, dismiss inward
experiential aspects and disregard internal mental states and consciousness (Graham,
2015). Such a sphere focused on observable behaviors that can be strictly perceived
as the result of external stimuli. These external stimuli typically manifest themselves
through conditioning. Conditioning is the process whereby behaviors become more
frequent or predictive in a given environment due to reinforcements. Reinforcements
are feedback, whether positive or negative, that function as a stimulus subsequent to a
particular response (Staddon & Cerutti, 2003). When considering this basis, humans
are consequently assumed to embody a state of passivity. In addition, the being is
viewed as a product of tabula rasa, or as possessing a clean slate. Free will then, as a
concept, possesses the presumption of illusory in nature.
In accordance with the deterministic perceptions of behaviorism, B.F. Skinner
produced radical theoretical assumptions. Skinner was intimately concerned with the
state of the external world. According to Skinnerian theoretical foundations, the
driver of behavior is the environment as a result of conditioning (Skinner, 1971). For
this reason, Skinner believed that a technology of behavior must necessarily be
produced. However, this technology required that the environment, rather than
humans be the prime target. Humans, according to Skinner, contained an inherent
lack of autonomy. This fictional sense of autonomy merely endured as a reinforcing
agent for the survival of aversive control for the human species (Skinner, 1971).
Behavior, and motivation as a result, were strictly engendered through the external
stimuli of the environment. Skinner argued that most behaviors were emitted through
operant conditioning (Skinner, 1971). Operant conditioning is engendered as an
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organism produces units of behavior that are sent forth into the environment. Such
operants are subsequently followed by consequences induced by the environmental
context. These consequences systematically shape succeeding emitted behavior
(Staddon & Cerutti, 2003). Responses, which are followed by reinforcements, are
more likely to occur in the future. Conversely, those behaviors not reinforced are less
likely to transpire. Behavior consequently “increases or decreases as a result of an
empirical law of effect” (Mueller, 2017b, slide 3). Humans, according to Skinner, are
controlled through the environment, which is always the originating source of
behavior (Skinner, 1971). Multiple apparatuses, both social and non-social, exist to
exert control over human autonomy. Such assertions support the supposition of
deterministic considerations.
While free will exists as a school of thought on one side of the debate,
determinism functions as the opposite perspective. Determinism is characterized by
the idea that humans are essentially subject to external forces and thus exert little
control over the environment. Baruch Spinoza and B.F. Skinner represent two
theorists who endorse doctrines of determinism from a philosophical and
psychological perspective respectively. Spinoza claimed a lack of human agency
through the establishment of substance monism. Substance monism asserts that God
is the only conception of causa sui, which requires that humans functionally rely
upon something external to exist (Spinoza, 2009). This reliance forces human
existence to be causally determined. Through the establishment of certain
motivational constructs, Skinner argued for deterministic considerations. The
environment, which functions as the originating source for behavior, continually
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conditions humans through reinforcements (Skinner, 1971). These theorists thus
remove free will from human existence. For these reasons, Spinoza and Skinner
illustrate proponents of an absence of human agency from two separate spheres of
influence.
Doctrines of Compatibilism
While the philosophical debate of human agency has typically articulated two
opposing sides, an alternate school exists. This coalition, known as the compatibilists,
has elucidated the notion that free will and determinism coexist with one another.
Friedrich Nietzsche, preeminently classified as an existentialist, systematically
rejected the separate existence of human freedom and determinism. Such rejection of
free will arises as a result of an apparent internal contradiction. Free will, according to
Nietzsche, relies upon the conception of the agent of causa sui (Nietzsche, 1927). The
concept of causa sui denotes something that is caused or generated within itself.
Causa sui proposes that human action results from choice, which in effect emerges
from the will. Will, however, is paradoxically determined by human nature (Grillaert,
2006). As a result, such a free will argument is inherently circular. In addition,
Nietzsche identifies a further internal inconsistency in the form of a false dichotomy.
“The belief in free will presupposes that the agent can be isolated from the act”
(Grillaert, 2006, p. 44). This dichotomy postulates a dualistic relationship between
humans and the world. According to Nietzsche, however, this reduces inherent
complexities to isolation and does not reflect the continuous flow of reality.
Subsequent to the rejection of free will, Nietzsche undermined the notion of
determinism. Determinism seemingly produces its origins in the conception of cause
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and effect. Nietzsche argued that such causality is engendered through false
comprehensions (Nietzsche, 2007). These false comprehensions occur through the
error of confusing the effect for the cause, while commonly rejecting the deep cause.
Additionally, humans commit the error of a false causality whereby non-existent
inner causalities, such as the human will, are invented. Such inventions arise based on
individually observed experiences of the will acting as casual. According to
Nietzsche, however, the inner causes merely accompany actions rather than act as a
basis for causality (Nietzsche, 2007). As a result, causality is an error of traditional
human thought. Mechanical necessity thus is not a fact, but rather an interpretation
(Leiter, 2007). For these reasons, the foundational elements that Kant and Spinoza
utilized in the debate between free will and determinism are rejected.
An analysis of the entirety of Nietzsche’s theory, however, indicates a
disposition towards compatibilism. While not wholly deterministic, humans are
inevitably subject to deterministic elements. Such elements manifest in the form of
psychological characteristics through individual childhood impressions, relationships,
and environmental stimuli (Grillaert, 2006). In addition, humans experience physical
determinants in the case of subjugation to natural laws and biological underpinnings.
For these reasons, evidence suggests that humans innately experience determinism.
However, Nietzsche also contended that the mere act of reflecting and reasoning on
the notion of free will systematically supposes inherent human freedom (Leiter,
2015). Free will, according to Nietzsche, is evident in individual character. Individual
character constitutes a hierarchy of drives. Sovereign individuals, through the
command of a strong rather than weak will, can organize these inherent drives
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(Nietzsche, 1927). A genuine self thus emerges, which guarantees autonomy. Humans
consequently exist within a deterministic environment, but freedom allows for the
manifestation of individual consequences of such effects through strength of will. The
concepts of determinism and free will exist as two antithetical forces whose inherent
significance relies primarily upon their opposition. As such, the two forces must
invariably exist as one another, outside a realm of duality. According to Nietzsche, it
is evident that these two inclinations function as complementary counterbalances of
one another.
Stemming from the philosophical consideration of Nietzsche, multiple
theorists have applied existentialism to the field of psychology. Prominent among
these theorists, Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss employed these deliberations
to the development of an existential model of individual personality (Binswanger,
1965; Boss, 1963). When considering the structural constructs of personality,
Binswanger and Boss articulated an existential phenomenology of being. Humans do
not exist in a state of duality, but rather subsist in unity (Rychlak, 1981).
Phenomenally, humans exist as their ideas and concretely illustrate the centrality of
existence, the state of being. As a result of this phenomenological assumption, the
dichotomy of unconsciousness and consciousness is causally rejected. Emanating
from such a phenomenological outlook is the core theoretical construct of these
existentialists, the dasein (Rychlak, 1981). The dasein is characterized by the
existence of being within multiple world designs. These multiple world designs
encompass human interaction with the eigenwelt (oneself), umwelt (the environment),
uberwelt (spirituality), and mitwelt (social beings). When considering such existence,
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Binswanger and Boss fundamentally disagreed upon the derivative of meaning.
Binswanger argued that existence is endowed with meaning by humans, whereas
Boss contended that existence discloses its meaning (Binswanger, 1965; Boss, 1963).
Human existence within the dasein necessarily produces implications for the
interplay of determinism and free will. Binswanger and Boss contend that humans are
thrown within the dasein and thus exist in a state of thrown-ness (Binswanger, 1965).
Such thrown-ness encompasses the circumstances with which individuals are
provided. These circumstances exist primarily as a result of biological and
environmental factors. In addition, spatial and temporal antecedents function as
imperative influences as well. As a result, thrown-ness represents the existential
accordance of determinism. Contained within this incidence of being thrown, humans
possess the innate capacity to experience pitch (Boss, 1963). Pitch is the primary
motivational construct for Binswanger and Boss as they suggested that humans are
constantly drawn to possibilities. Fundamentally, pitch allows humans to choose to
transcend their inherent circumstances and project opposition to the rigidity of a
seemingly inflexible environment. Existentialists articulate that the central theme in
existence is to “advance on life actively and assume the responsibility of meeting our
possibilities to enrich and extend Dasein” (Rychlak, 1981, p. 645). Such a notion of
pitch allows for a challenge to thrown-ness consequently engendering the exhibition
of individual autonomy. In addition, existential anxiety arises as a result of a basic
sense that it is impossible to fulfill every available option in life. The capacity to
deliberate upon various choices and thereafter attempt to fulfill all options in life
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further points to this notion of human freedom. As a result, existential psychology
articulates a necessary interplay between determinism and free will.
From Agency to Sense of Agency
It is evident that philosophers and psychologists have fundamentally disagreed
over the existence of human sense of agency. Despite such controversy, the field has
transitioned to determine not whether agency exists, but whether the belief in agency
engenders effects. Researchers have indicated that the mere belief in the idea of free
will produces significant effects in the cognitive realm and subsequent behavior of
humans (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). Higher levels of sense of agency have been
correlated with positive cognitive effects and behaviors. Conversely, a diminished
sense of agency produces detrimental effects in the realm of cognition and behavior.
In an effort to ascertain such effects, psychologists have typically assessed the
consequences of sense of human agency through two separate processes,
“measurement and experimental manipulation,” (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012).
Experimental manipulation involves introducing the concepts of free will or
determinism to participants. Thereafter, participants are placed into an experimentally
conceived social situation for observation, whereupon measurement of change is
needed. When considering measurement processes, psychologists have developed
multiple instruments, such as the Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale, for
consequential analyses (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). These two categories of assessment
exist independently of one another. However, evidence has suggested that the most
effective means of determining the effects of sense of agency on human behavior and
cognition is by utilizing these two categories in tandem (Paulhus & Carey, 2011).
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Through these processes, researchers have established a correlation between human
agency and both cognition and behavior (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012).
Higher Sense of Agency
Upon analysis of the consequences associated with human agency, many
researchers have noted that human cognition and behavior are significantly affected.
A higher sense of agency is characterized by a greater belief in free will. Researchers
have indicated that as an individual possesses a higher level of agency, they are more
likely to experience positive cognitive effects as well as to exhibit more prosocial
behaviors (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). Within the cognitive realm, a heightened
sense of agency has been intimately linked to increased beliefs of self-efficacy. This
self-efficacy belief is inherently intertwined with the concept of individual
motivation. Bandura (1989), a lead researcher in this domain, has suggested, “selfefficacy beliefs determine … level of motivation” (p. 1176). Cognitively, individuals
with a high sense of agency have also illustrated heightened life satisfaction and
meaningfulness. Sense of agency, as researchers have indicated, facilitates
attributions of moral responsibility. In addition to these cognitive effects, a
heightened sense of agency produces an increased likelihood for the exhibition of
prosocial behaviors. Prosocial behaviors are those that are socially desirable and
intended for the benefit of others. These behaviors are characterized by empathy and
a concern for the well-being and rights of other individuals (Knickerbocker, 2003).
Ultimately, it can be seen that a greater belief in free will is correlated with positive
cognitive effects (e.g., self-efficacy, meaning in life, and moral attribution) and
prosocial behaviors (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012).
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Positive cognitive effects. When considering the notion of heightened levels
of human agency, evidence suggests that individuals experience positive cognitive
effects. One such cognitive benefit is an increased belief in self-efficacy. Albert
Bandura (1989), contra Skinner, argued that humans do have agency, and noted that
self-efficacy functions as the most central and pervasive mechanism for human
agency. Self-efficacy is characterized as a person’s belief in his or her capabilities as
well as their ability to exercise control over events that affect their lives (Bandura,
1989). An imperative function of thought systematically stems from this concept.
This idea of self-efficacy enables individuals to predict their own ability to influence
the environment and subsequent events, thus creating the means for exercising
control. Belief in individual capabilities influences the type of scenarios that are
psychologically constructed and reiterated. Those with high self-efficacy, as attained
through heightened sense of personal agency, are more inclined to materialize
positive scenarios that function as guides for behavior (Bandura, 2006). This
additionally enhances performance within a particular domain. These individuals can
also exert influence over their selective processes so as to engender beneficial
environments. Conversely, perceptually inefficacious individuals primarily focus on
negativity and simulations that can go wrong, which typically undermines
performance (Bandura, 1989). This self-efficacy is possible only as individuals
believe they are able to operate situationally and within the spectrum of their
capabilities.
The concept of self-efficacy, and human agency as a result, is naturally
interlaced with individual motivation. Motivation is typically characterized as the
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reason for one’s direction and inclination to engage in a specific behavior. In
addition, the term motivation encompasses the willingness of an individual to perform
such a behavior (Lai, 2011). Evidence suggests that self-efficacy modulates levels of
motivation. This is reflected in how much effort an individual is willing to exert, as
well as how long they will persevere in the face of adversity (Bandura, 1989). The
stronger that an individual believes in their ability to influence the future through
their capabilities, the more persistent they will be in their endeavors. Such individuals
will exert greater effort to master challenges, as well as to accomplish goals. Ordinary
social reality is pervaded with impediments, adversities, and failures. People of low
self-efficacy are liable to become convinced of the futility of their endeavors and
subsequently cease their efforts. Conversely, efficacious individuals perceive such
difficulties as surmountable through their capabilities, and functionally remain
resilient (Bandura, 2006). In essence, heightened sense of agency fosters self-efficacy
through the belief that individual capabilities can influence the future. This selfefficacy produces motivational effects through perseverance and resiliency. Such
motivational effects are feasible through the belief that one is free to influence future
outcomes.
In addition to increased self-efficacy and motivation, heightened sense of
agency is positively correlated with self-perceived meaningfulness of life and life
satisfaction (Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, &
Lambert, 2016; Seto, Hicks, Davis, & Smallman, 2015). A deterministic view posits
that the outcome of an event is the only outcome that could have materialized. As a
result, this phenomenon engenders a reductionist perception of meaning in life, a key
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existential theme. Existentially, humans impart meaning on their choices and the
subsequent reality of the outcomes (Crescioni et al., 2016). When determinism
systematically reduces an individual to the subjugation of external forces, sense of
meaning is diminished. Conversely, high free will belief has been shown to increase
life meaningfulness and satisfaction. Such indication of meaning is aided through a
process known as counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual reflections are “mental
representations of alternatives to past occurrences” that presuppose an outcome could
have been otherwise (Seto et al., 2015, p. 243). These reflections illustrate causal
inferences that create awareness of the sequence of events that led to current
circumstances. Counterfactual thinking, and free will belief as a result, emphasize the
mutability of individual action. Such reflections serve to accentuate the importance of
prior events chosen by the individual and their influence on the events that occurred
(Seto et al., 2015). Experiences are perceived as meaningful because they could have
occurred differently, resulting in entirely different circumstances, which though
hypothetical, enhances the sense of personal agency. Personal action has ultimately
dictated the context that one exists within. As a result, free will belief allows one to
impart and amplify meaning on the experiences caused by individual action through a
seemingly infinite amount of possibilities, both counterfactual and future.
Further evaluation of the positive cognitive effects associated with higher
levels of human agency reveals that moral attribution is a closely related concept.
Free will functions as a prerequisite for individual responsibility. As Moore (2016)
has suggested, “sense of agency plays a key role in guiding attributions of
responsibility” (p. 7). In order to hold an individual morally responsible for their
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action, they must necessarily possess the capacity to choose different courses of
action. Conversely, when genuine choice is deemed impossible, moral responsibility
is undermined. The concept of moral attribution consequently produces cognitive and
behavioral implications. Individuals are unable to utilize determinism as a viable
excuse for immoral behavior (Shariff et al., 2014). In addition, this individual
responsibility functions as an adaptive challenge to suppress antisocial behaviors and
lapses of self-control. Morality also becomes imperative in the broader context of
society. The capacity to hold individuals morally responsible for their actions allows
for punishment. Punishment, in this sense, functions as a benefit to societal
functioning through establishing cultural principles in the realm of morality and
behavior (Clark et al., 2014). Cooperation and ethics, through fear of punitive
measures, are also engendered as moral obligations when the notion of free will belief
exists. Finally, this concept of morality functions as a means of deterring antisocial
behavior and thereby promoting the exhibition of prosocial behaviors. It can be seen
that free will implies moral responsibility, which acts as a positive cognitive and
behavioral effect.
Prosocial behaviors. A higher sense of agency has been positively correlated
to beneficial cognitive effects. Such cognitive effects extend into the physical realm
and incite prosocial behaviors. Free will belief enables humans to experience feelings
of empathy. “Empathy has been described as an affective vicarious response,
isomorphic to the emotion that provoked it” (Lepron, Cuasse, & Farrer, 2014, p. 1).
This affective emotion essentially allows an individual to feel as another feels.
Empathic responses emerge as individuals judge themselves to be responsible agents
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and attribute morality to their actions. Such an emotion produces inherent
implications in the regulation of social behaviors. Enhanced empathic response is
closely linked and perceived as a trigger for prosocial behavior. This prosocial
behavior is observed through human willingness to help, which empathy functions as
a primary factor and indicator (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008).
Helping others is socially desirable and centrally related to the concept of being
performed for the benefit of others. Belief in free will is positively associated with
helping. As such, individuals with heightened human agency, and empathic concern,
are more willing to help across situations and opportunities. It can thus be seen that
“belief in free will is a valuable support for prosocial behavior” (Baumeister et al,
2009, p. 267). Ultimately, high sense of agency engenders positive cognitive effects
and prosocial behaviors, which is beneficial to society.
Lower Sense of Agency
When considering the consequences of the sense of human agency,
researchers have also observed that a lower sense of agency produces variant effects.
A lower sense of agency is characterized by a decreased belief in free will, or a more
deterministic worldview. As a result, researchers have indicated that as an individual
possesses a lower level of agency, they are more likely to experience detrimental
cognitive effects as well as the exhibition of antisocial behaviors (Baumeister &
Brewer, 2012). Within the cognitive realm, a diminished sense of agency is correlated
with increased negative affective processes. Individuals are likely to experience
amotivation and an increased reliance upon instinct. Instinct, in this sense, refers to a
set of behaviors, which are unlearned and result from an environmental stimulus.
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Prosocial behaviors require the expenditure of personal resources such as time and
energy. For this reason, individuals tend to default to innate responses of self-interest
(DeWall et al., 2008). Amotivation additionally facilitates feelings of indifference and
overall passivity throughout the lifespan. Such cognitive effects inhibit the individual
and engender the exhibition of antisocial behaviors. Antisocial behaviors are those
that are outside the realm of social acceptance and morality. Typically, these
antisocial behaviors are identified by harmful and negative intentionality (BaskinSommers, 2011). Individuals become more likely to act through naturally selfish
impulses and to display increased aggressive tendencies. In addition, those who
possess a deterministic worldview display a reduction in willingness to help others.
Essentially, a lower sense of agency is correlated with negative cognitive effects and
antisocial behaviors (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012).
Negative cognitive effects. As an individual holds a lower sense of human
agency, they experience an increase in negative affective processes. Affective
processes include all feelings and responses related to behavior, knowledge, and
beliefs (Merritt, 2011). These emotional reactions possess the capacity to alter the
nature and course of individual cognition. For example, individuals constrained in
these negative affectivities experience heightened levels of stress and depression. In
addition, these individuals typically experience high levels of anxiety arousal
(Bandura, 1989). Such affectivities arise as a result of decreased belief in self-efficacy
as people doubt their capabilities to handle particular situations. Inefficacious
thoughts produce apprehensive cognitions, which promote feelings of stress as
individuals focus on deficiencies. Depression materializes when inefficacy produces
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negative evaluations of one’s self-worth. This diminished self-worth aids in
ruminative thoughts that constrain adaptive abilities. Finally, anxiety is engendered as
individuals experience aversive cognitions coupled with an inability to alter perceived
efficacy of thought control (Bandura, 1989). These negative affectivities also possess
the capacity to affect biological systems, thereby producing adverse physiological
effects, such as immunodeficiency (Bandura, 1989). Fundamentally, evidence
suggests that inefficacious thoughts inhibit and impair level of functioning, both
cognitively and behaviorally. Perceived inefficacy emerges as a result of diminished
levels of personal agency.
Antisocial behaviors. In addition to these cognitive detriments, lower levels
of sense of human agency produce effects on individual behavior. Humans, as
philosophers and psychologists have suggested, have internal motivational conflicts.
This motivational dissension involves natural inclinations towards selfish impulses
and conflicting socially imposed prosocial motivations. Based upon evolutionary
principles, researchers have indicated that humans are innately predisposed towards
exhibiting selfish tendencies (Baumeister et al., 2009; DeWall et al., 2008; Harms,
Liket, Protzko, & Schölmerich, (2017). From an evolutionary standpoint, organisms
exhibit selfish tendencies for survival. It appears to be an automatic impulse for
humans to act without concern for others. As a result, “ a significant amount of selfcontrol and mental energy is required to override this default” (Baumeister et al.,
2009, p. 261). Such an idea is intimately connected to the concept of amotivation
brought about by low levels of human agency. Disbelief in free will possesses the
capacity to serve as a subtle clue that exerting volition and self-control is futile. This
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perceived futility inhibits individual willingness to exert energy on self-regulation.
Without the capacity for self-regulation, individuals would enact all impulses, for
which many appear to be antisocial in nature (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014). Selfregulation thus is imperative for constraining automatic antisocial tendencies (DeWall
et al., 2008). Additionally, this reduction in volition willingness facilitates feelings of
indifference and passivity, which promotes impulsivity. For this reason, it can be seen
that “a belief in free will … is crucial for motivating people to control their automatic
impulses in favor of more prosocial forms of behavior” (Baumeister et al., 2009, p.
261).
Reduction in willingness to exert volition and self-regulation, brought about
through decreased sense of human agency, produces implicit implications for
behavior. Essentially, it possesses the capacity to allow socially undesirable and
antisocial behaviors. Aggression functions as a natural impulse present in human
beings. Typically, such aggressive impulses are consciously blocked by strong inner
restraints. However, as self-regulation decreases, failure of these inner restraints
increases (DeWall et al., 2007). This internal failure occurs regardless of the root
cause of the anger. Disbelief in free will is thus correlated to an increase in
manifested aggression. Stemming from these aggressive impulses, evidence suggests
that individuals are more likely to perform acts of violence. Aggressive tendencies
tangibly evince themselves at a higher rate than if constraints were available. A
lowered inclination to exert volition and effort thus facilitates physical action on
aggressive impulses (DeWall et al., 2007). In addition to this aggressiveness, humans
also display selfish and passive actions. Individuals are less willing to help across an
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assortment of situations and opportunities. This comes as a result of responding
automatically to internal, negative impulses as opposed to exerting self-control.
Human helpfulness intimately requires exertion of the self (Baumeister et al., 2009).
Passivity towards others is consequently engendered through this lack of volition.
Such passivity correlates to a reduction in willingness to assist others. Ultimately,
“disbelief in free will led to an increase in aggression and a reduction in willingness
to help” (Baumeister, et al., 2009, p. 267). As a result, it can be seen that diminished
levels of human agency engender negative cognitive effects as well antisocial
behaviors.
Argument for this Study
An analysis of the research associated with human agency illustrates a gap in
our knowledge about the importance of individual sense of agency. As an individual
experiences heightened levels of belief in free will, they are more likely to experience
beneficial cognitive effects. In addition, these cognitive effects are accompanied by
an increase in the exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Conversely, as an individual
possesses diminished levels of free will belief, they typically experience detrimental
cognitive effects. Antisocial behaviors materialize from a low sense of human
agency. Such an association inherently engenders implications for both the individual
and society as a whole. Individuals could potentially experience the benefits of
positive cognitive effects, while society would observe an increase in socially
desirable and empathic behaviors. This would simultaneously occur with a decrease
in detrimental cognitions and antisocial behaviors. Despite this correlation, however,
researchers have not yet attempted to experimentally prime and enhance free will
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belief in humans. For this reason, in this study I sought to determine if human sense
of agency could be primed and subsequently enhanced, resulting in increased
expressions of prosocial behaviors.
The hypotheses associated with this study, labeled as H1 and H2, were as follows:


H1: Individual sense of agency possesses the potential to be primed and
subsequently enhanced.



H2: Enhanced sense of agency will ultimately induce an increase in the
exhibition of prosocial behaviors, as seen in individuals in an experimental
group as compared to the control group.
Method

Participant Characteristics
Potential participant population. Participants were primarily individuals of
traditional undergraduate student age (18-23 years) at Concordia University –
Portland. Contingent upon instructor permission to conduct the study, participants
included those enrolled in introductory and upper division psychology courses. As a
result, all years of study were eligible. This was done in an attempt to avoid a
demographic representation bias from any specific area of study. Such a population
was chosen in an effort to represent the general body of Concordia University in as
accurate a way as possible. This sample was primarily drawn as a result of a
convenience sampling strategy.
Demographics. Participants were 130 undergraduate students at Concordia
University- Portland. The age range of students was 17 – 52 with the majority of
participants (approximately 82.4%) falling within traditional undergraduate age.
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Females comprised 70.2% of participants with males composing the other 20.8%. The
majority of participants (55.7%; n=73) identified as Caucasian. A total of 3.1% were
African American, 17.6% were Asian/ Pacific Islander, 11.5% were Latino/a, and
11.5% identified as other. When considering faith tradition, participants primarily
identified as Christian (39.7%), Catholic (13.0%), Non-denominational Christian
(10.7%) and Unaffiliated (10.7%). Multiple other faith traditions, from participants
within the study, were claimed as well. The majority of participants were currently
pursuing degrees in Business Administration (9.2%), Nursing (31.3%), and
Psychology (23.7%). Students from various other majors were also present in the
study. Finally, the study obtained data from 41.2% freshman, 27.5% sophomores,
16.8% juniors, 13% seniors, and 0.8% fifth year seniors.
Relationship/role with the participants. The researcher is a student at
Concordia University – Portland. With the permission of various introductory and
upper division psychology instructors, I obtained access to my intended participant
population at Concordia University – Portland. Beyond the context of this study, I
have had no contact with the participants concerning the nature of my experiment.
Following the conclusion of this study, the majority of participants were debriefed of
all deceptive practices involved via written communication. Through Qualtrics,
participants were provided with a written debrief sheet that possessed downloadable
capabilities. The debrief sheet outlined the entirety of the study and articulated the
true nature of the research. At instructor request, the researcher verbally debriefed one
class. Beyond such debriefing, I neither foresaw, nor anticipated any future contact
following the conclusion of the study.
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Recruited population included/excluded. In an attempt to avoid bias in the
study, I sought to recruit a sample that was demographically representative of the
Concordia – Portland student body. This assisted in reducing threat to external
validity and generalizability. As a result, there was no exclusion criterion, as no
groups were deliberately left out of the study.
Sampling procedures
Sampling method. This study utilized convenience sampling. Participants
were those who participated on a voluntary basis and were provided the option to
withdraw at any point in time. Each person who consented (see Appendix A) was
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions or one control condition.
Permission was sought, and consequently obtained, from professors of general
education courses.
Sample size, power, and precision. To estimate required sample size a power
analysis for a one-way ANOVA with three groups was conducted to arrive at a
desired sample size of 160 participants (assumptions in the power analysis were as
follows: alpha = .05; power = 0.80; medium effect size (f=0.25)).
Data Collection Procedures
Setting for data collection. This study was conducted in the classroom
environment of Concordia University – Portland, contingent upon instructor
permission. The experiment was conducted in introductory and upper division
psychology courses at the beginning of scheduled class time. All participants
completed a measure of sense of agency at the same time. Data collection was multi-
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site and the experiment was conducted in as many classrooms as necessary to attain
the desired demographic representation.
Study procedures
Research design. Participants were provided with a constructed verbal
summary of the study. Deception was used throughout this study. To avoid response
bias, the terms “free will” and “determinism” were not utilized. If the participants had
known the true nature of the study, social desirability could have arisen and prevented
participants from behaving in an honest manner. Minor deception was thus inherently
necessary during the completion of the initial sense of agency questionnaire. Such
minor deception was associated with minimal risk for participants. Participants were
informed of the true nature of the study at the conclusion of the study during
debriefing.
All participants were asked to utilize a device with online capabilities and
were provided, by the researcher, with the link to a website. This link directed
participants to a data collection website named Qualtrics. Each participant was
provided with an online informed consent form (see Appendix A). The informed
consent form provided participants with the option to participate or not participate in
the study. Students who did not wish to participate were redirected to a separate page
thanking them for their time and consideration. This page also asked students to
remain online so as not to distract others, which aided in participant anonymity. In
addition, students were provided the option to withdraw at any point during the study
if they did not wish to continue. Information that did not impact the required
deceptiveness was included as well.
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For students who chose to participate, Qualtrics redirected participants to a
pre-questionnaire designed to measures an individual’s sense of agency (described in
the Measures and Covariates section below). Questionnaire items were utilized in an
effort to obtain information on how each participant viewed free will and
determinism. This acted as a measure of one’s sense of agency. Once the participants
completed all constructs, participants were randomly assigned into one of two
experimental conditions or one controlled condition, using the block randomization
feature available in Qualtrics. Once randomly assigned, each participant was provided
with a vignette describing a study of human agency. This vignette was based on the
1964 free will study performed by Benjamin Libet (2011). The base vignette, along
with those containing alternate endings, are available in Appendix C.
The vignette was from the same “author and study,” but the results were
altered based upon the experimental condition one was randomly assigned. As a
result, in its three forms, this vignette acted as a compilation of measurement and
experimental manipulation as introduced by previous studies (Paulhus & Carey 2011;
Vohs and Schooler 2008). The conditions are labeled as C1 – C3 below.
C1: (Control Condition) Participants read a vignette that simultaneously proves and
disproves free will.
C2: Participants read a vignette that proves free will as a product of human agency.
C3: Participants read a vignette that indicates a disproval of free will and thus
indicates a worldview of determinism as a product of human agency.
Once all vignettes were read, the post sense of agency questionnaire was
administered and completed. The total scores measured any changes in previous
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beliefs on human agency, which indicated individual sense of agency. The pre/post
difference score was the first of two dependent variables in the study. This is
associated with hypothesis H1.
This aspect of the study utilized deception. At the conclusion of the
questionnaire, participants were redirected to a page thanking them for their
participation and informing them of the conclusion of the study. However, on the
page, an additional note provided information concerning an opportunity for the
exhibition of some form of prosocial behavior. This behavior was measured through
some form of volunteer work performed with an inconvenience. This was
conceptualized as an “opportunity that Concordia University desires to provide to all
students who participated in research activities.” See Appendix B (IRB CU-07d
document) for complete text for this portion of the experiment. Participants received a
brief description of the opportunity, thus allowing them to review the potential task.
Each participant was then provided with the opportunity to check whether or not they
would like to volunteer. This measured prosocial intent as well as exhibition of the
behavior on the part of the participants. As such, this constituted the second of the
two dependent variables; this is associated with hypothesis H2. Students did not
disclose their actual name; instead they disclosed their G number. This helped to
maintain anonymity and reduced the potential for social desirability.
Participants were finally debriefed on the true nature of the study. The
researcher explained the research and revealed the hypotheses involved. There were
no anticipated adverse reactions to this study, and thus further services are likely not
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required. Finally, participants were provided with an opportunity to pose questions to
the researcher concerning the study and any further concerns.
Measures and covariates. When considering measures of sense of agency,
two categories exist. They are implicit and explicit measures utilized to determine
free will belief. Implicit measures use perceptual differences between self and
externally generated stimuli as measures of sense of agency. Conversely, explicit
measures include scales and questionnaires (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). This study
utilized explicit measures. The explicit measure utilized was the Free Will and
Determinism Plus Scale, developed by Palhous and Carey, which contained 28
questions divided into four subscales. Such subscales included Free Will, Scientific
Determinism, Fatalistic Determinism, and Unpredictability. Analysis of the subscale
revealed that the “alpha reliability of the Unpredictable scale is .72 … Free Will alpha
= .70, Scientific Determinism alpha = .69, and Fatalistic Determinism alpha = .82”
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011, p. 101). Paulhus and Carey (2011) subsequently conducted
further testing on the construct ultimately producing evidence and support for its
validity.
While the Free Will subscale of the FAD Plus was used to assess individual
sense of agency, behavioral intent was measured through single item, yes or no
response to an upcoming “volunteer opportunity.” This volunteer opportunity, with
perceived inconvenience, was provided at the conclusion of the study. The volunteer
opportunity was offered under deceptive practices in order to conceal the true nature
of the study and prevent participant desirability biases. That is, after what they
perceived to be the conclusion of the study, participants were able to indicate, through
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their single item response, whether or not they desired to engage in the volunteer
opportunity. Volunteering is socially perceived as a desirable behavior. As a result,
this desire to participate indicated behavioral intent and the exhibition of a prosocial
behavior. The intent and prosocial behavior is associated with the second hypothesis
of the study.
Plan to deal with withdraw, “loss-to-follow-up,” or some reason to stop
study. In the event a participant chose to withdraw, the corresponding questionnaire
and consent form was discarded by Qualtrics.
Declaration on Conflicts of Interest or lack thereof. I did not anticipate and
there did not appear to be any conflicts of interest in this study.
Data Analysis Procedures
Data Management Procedures. As all participants responded to
instrumentation via an online surveying platform (Qualtrics), data entry was not
required. Instead, data as entered was exported from the platform directly to a format
readable by Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Questionnaire results
were analyzed through SPSS in an effort to filter for usable data. Frequencies and
descriptive statistics were executed to check for errors and missing data in categorical
and continuous variables. No missing data were obtained.
Statistical Analyses
After assessment of compliance with associated statistical assumptions,
analyses of group differences were conducted for each hypothesis. For hypothesis
one, obtained data was analyzed utilizing a parametric test. A parametric test was
used because the variable being measured was at the interval level. As a result, a one-
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way ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact of various vignettes on individual
sense of agency. ANOVA was utilized due to the presence of three groups within the
independent variable.
For the second hypothesis of this study, a non-parametric test was performed.
A non-parametric test was required due to the fact that the level of the data was not at
least interval. Rather, the data was at the ordinal level of measurement. For this
reason, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to analyze differences in behavioral
intent among the three separate groups.
Data Protection and Security Plan
Due to the fact that names were not utilized in the course of this study,
participant confidentiality was ensured. Student demographic information was
recorded in an effort to reduce a demographic representation bias. However, such
demographic information was coded so as to be unable to connect such information
with individual participants. The codes were utilized to connect each students pre and
post responses to one another. G numbers, during the volunteer opportunity, were
utilized to connect the exhibition of prosocial intent to the randomized group.
However, once all data had been entered, G numbers were removed from the dataset
in an effort to effectively de-identify the data in digital storage. Completed
questionnaires were accessible to the researcher, and thesis advisor when necessary.
ANOVA results were stored on the computer of the researcher and protected under
username and password.
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Risks and Discomforts
Even with the use of deception throughout this study, I did not anticipate any
risks or discomforts for the participants. There did not appear to be any sensitive
information contained within this study. The researcher attempted to mitigate any
potential distress for participants experienced throughout the study.
Benefits
This study was beneficial because if the hypothesis is correct, then society
will experience an increase in prosocial behavior by individuals. Belief in free will, as
demonstrated above, is intimately linked to a reduction in antisocial behaviors.
Priming or enhancing this sense of agency would seemingly enhance the exhibition of
desired societal behavior. In addition, this study could be beneficial to participants.
Current research has indicated that a higher sense of agency is correlated with
cognitive benefits such as increased perceived meaning in life. If the experiment does
prime sense of agency, then there is increased potential to experience more desirable
cognitive processes.
Costs and Compensations
To ensure that participation is completely voluntary, participants were not
compensated. Excluding compensation from this study aided in the avoidance of
participant coercion. As a result, this study necessarily remained completely
voluntary without compensation for individuals.
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Results

Descriptive Statistics
For all 130 participants who consented to the study, the survey was performed
to completion. As a result, no missing data were present. Participants were randomly
assigned to three conditions. Randomized groups were those who received the free
will vignette in Experimental Condition 1 (N = 41), those who received the
determinism vignette in Experimental Condition 2 (N = 45), and those who received
the base vignette in the Control Condition (N = 44). After utilizing ANOVA, no
significant differences were obtained between groups with regard to age, sex,
education, academic year, and marital status. As a result, confounding variables can
be eliminated.
For each participant, pre-to-post change scores on the Free Will subscale of
the FAD Plus scale were calculated using SPSS. Students in Experimental Condition
1 reported no changes in free will belief (M = .000, SD = 1.97), while participants in
Experimental Condition 2 (M = .067, SD =2.85) indicated minimal positive changes
in free will belief and participants in the Control Condition (M = -.091, SD = 2.34)
exhibited negative changes in free will belief.
Behavioral intent was measured using a single item response concerning a
volunteer opportunity. Of the 130 participants within the study, approximately 14.6%
(N=19) indicated a desire to engage in the prosocial behavior. Within these 19
participants, 7.7% were in Experimental Condition 1 (N=10), 3.8% were in
Experimental Condition 2 (N=5), and 3.1% were in the Control Condition (N=4). The
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majority of participants (85.4%, N=111) did not express an increased exhibition of
prosocial intent through the volunteer opportunity.
Hypothesis 1: Priming Sense of Agency
The first question associated with this study was to test whether individual
sense of agency could be enhanced with priming. Hypothesis one postulated that
individual sense of agency possesses the potential to be primed and subsequently
enhanced. To test H1, a one way between subjects ANOVA was conducted using
group assignment as the independent variable and total change scores on the Free
Will subscale of the FAD Plus as the dependent variable.
The one-way ANOVA is a parametric test utilized for comparing multiple
groups or conditions. However, the use of a one-way ANOVA requires that a set of
assumptions be satisfied. Assumption one necessitates that the dependent variable
must be measured at the interval or ratio level. Such variables must necessarily be
continuous. When considering the independent variable, it should consist of two or
more categorical, independent groups. Typically, a one-way ANOVA is utilized with
three or more categorical groups; otherwise an independent samples t-test could be
used. A third assumption is that an independence of observations is obtained.
Participants cannot be in more than one group and different participants must be in
each group. An approximate normal distribution of the dependent variable for each
category of the independent variables should also be obtained. Finally, in order to run
a one-way ANOVA, homogeneity of variances needs to be present in the data.
The data associated with the first hypothesis of this study meets the criteria
necessary for the use of an ANOVA. Upon analysis, the overall the mean FAD Plus

SENSE OF AGENCY

44

scores for the pre-questionnaire (M = 17.41, SD = 3.54) were lower than the overall
mean FAD Plus scores of the post questionnaire (M = 17.42, SD = 3.42). Despite this
increase in scores, a one-way ANOVA revealed that the change was not statistically
significant, F(2, 127) = 0.954, p > .05.
Hypothesis 2: Prosocial Behaviors
The second hypothesis associated with this study was to determine if
heightened sense of agency would induce an increased exhibition of prosocial
behaviors. A volunteer opportunity was deceptively presented at the conclusion of the
post-questionnaire, with a single-item response option as indicated in the method
section; this operationalized prosocial behavioral intent. Answers were entered by
participants and subsequently coded within SPSS. Participants were separated into
three groups based upon their randomly assigned condition and vignette.
In the event there is a lack of normality, as indicated by failure with regard to
statistical assumptions, separate analyses must be conducted. ANOVA is a parametric
test utilized for three or more groups. A Kruskal-Wallis H (KWH) test represents a
non-parametric measure for the same design. Hypothesis two of this study does not
meet the necessary criteria to be considered to possess normality. With regard to
behavioral intent, the study utilized an ordinal level of measurement. As a result, it is
more appropriate to run a Kruskal-Wallis H test for this hypothesis as opposed to an
ANOVA.
A Kruskal-Wallis H test was conducted to determine if intent to volunteer was
different among the various groups. A Kruskal-Wallis H test revealed that no
statistically significant difference was present, X2 (2) = 4.62, p > .05. Because no
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overall effect was observed, the necessity of subsequent pairwise comparison was
negated.
Discussion
The present research was conducted to assess whether it was possible to prime
individual sense of agency to enhance it and to determine if such enhancement would
induce an increase in the exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Researchers in this
domain have indicated that an increased belief in free will is associated with positive
cognitive effects and an increased exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Conversely, a
diminished belief in free will is correlated with negative cognitive effects and an
increase in the exhibition of antisocial behaviors. The data reported on within this
study reveal that the presentation of a vignette was not effective in altering individual
sense of agency at a level that was statistically significant, at least as could be
detected by the FAD Plus scale or could be consciously perceived. Rather, though in
the predicted direction for each group, the mean of the overall scores varied only
slightly after the presentation of various conditions. In addition, no significant
difference was observed when considering the relation of various conditions to one
other. Such a finding appears counter to prior research, as previous studies produced
significant results in affecting sense of agency through the use of vignettes.
A second hypothesis was also assessed in this study. Through H2, I proposed
that a heightened sense of agency would induce an increase in the exhibition of
prosocial behaviors. The data did not support this. This hypothesis represented a gap
in the prior research for this psychological area. Prior studies have attempted to
determine whether a lowered sense of agency would lead to an increase in antisocial
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behaviors. However, a gap existed wherein studies had not been conducted to
determine if heightened free will belief would increase prosocial behaviors. The
hypotheses of previous studies and the current study seemingly appear to be inverted
of one another. Intuitively, as free will increases deterministic perceptions should
decrease. In addition, as prosocial behaviors increase antisocial behaviors should
diminish. Fundamentally, the inverse should remain true of both. Despite the presence
of this relationship, the data of the current study are not congruent with the findings
of previous studies.
Limitations
Throughout the course of this study, multiple limitations inevitably
manifested. One such limitation deals primarily with the presentation of the vignettes.
The vignettes, due to the complicated nature of the subject of the study, were dense
readings. Such density could have caused some participants to skim the readings
rather than analyzing the vignettes carefully. Sparse reading of the vignettes would
diminish the effectiveness of the conclusions and effectively reduce the potential for
priming sense of agency in the participant. While this represents a potential limitation
in this study, this did not appear to be the case in previous experiments. Previous
experiments utilized a different delivery system. Physical materials were administered
rather than provided online. Other studies could have also potentially negated this
effect through requiring that participants construct an abstract of the text that was
provided. This would likely create the perception, for the participant, that the vignette
needed to be analyzed carefully.
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A power analysis also produced the need for 160 participants. This is a
relatively small sample size that may need to be expanded in future replications.
Additionally, while the researcher and professors indicated that there was no
compensation for participation, and conversely no risk for non-participation, the
presence of a professor and the classroom environment could have increased
participant coercion. Ultimately, the use of convenience sampling could produce an
effect on the generalizability of the study.
When considering the second hypothesis associated with this study, a
limitation emerged. The volunteer opportunity only provided for one available time
and did not specify when the opportunity was occurring. As a result, multiple
participants may have had prior commitments and were consequently forced to
choose not to engage in the prosocial behavior. Such a limitation potentially reduced
the number of participants who desired to engage in the volunteer opportunity and
exhibit prosocial intent. Multiple other provided options may reduce such a conflict
of interests.
Future Directions
Within this particular domain, there exists the potential for future directions of
study. One such direction, which would be valuable, would be to expand the intensity
of the opportunity for prosocial behavior in order to determine the extent of prosocial
intent. Another future direction with this particular research deals primarily with the
time frame of the second hypothesis of this study. The prosocial intent and behavior
was measured immediately after the proposed priming. As of now, it is unknown if
the supposed priming would manifest itself for a brief or extended period of time. A
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longitudinal study, though difficult due to the necessity of intense deceptive practices
to reduce social desirability, would be beneficial in this regard. This particular issue
of timing produces immense implications for the potential benefit of society.
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Appendix A

CONSENT FORM
Research Study Title: Sense of Agency and Enhancement of Prosocial
Behaviors
Principal Investigator: Tyler Charlton
Research Institution: Concordia University
Faculty Advisor: Reed Mueller
Purpose and what you will be doing:
The purpose of this survey is to observe the psychological effects of individual
sense of agency. We expect approximately 160 volunteers. No one will be
paid to be in the study. We will begin enrollment on January 10, 2018 and end
enrollment on February 10, 2018.To be in the study, you will begin by
providing answers to a questionnaire administered by the researcher. You will
then read a short passage before the administration of a post questionnaire.
Doing these things should take less than thirty minutes of your time.
Risks:
There are no risks to participating in this study other than providing your
information. However, we will protect your information. Any personal
information you provide will be coded so it cannot be linked to you. Any name
or identifying information you give will be kept securely via electronic
encryption or locked inside the file cabinet of the researcher. When we or any
of our investigators look at the data, none of the data will have your name or
identifying information. We will only use a secret code to analyze the data.
We will not identify you in any publication or report. Your information will be
kept private at all times and then all study documents will be destroyed 3
years after we conclude this study. Some details of the project may not be
made to me until my session is completed. I realize at the completion of my
session that I have the option of withholding the responses I have provided
from subsequent analysis.
Benefits:
Information you provide will help advance knowledge of human cognition and
behavior. In addition, this will aid in the benefit of deepening the knowledge
of human agency. You could benefit this by assisting in the study to illustrate
a relationship between sense of agency and cognitive effects.
Confidentiality:

This information will not be distributed to any other agency and will be kept
private and confidential. The only exception to this is if you tell us abuse or
neglect that makes us seriously concerned for your immediate health and
safety.
Right to Withdraw:
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Your participation is greatly appreciated, but we acknowledge that the
questions we are asking are personal in nature. You are free at any point to
choose not to engage with or stop the study. You may skip any questions
you do not wish to answer. This study is not required and there is no penalty
for not participating. If at any time you experience a negative emotion from
answering the questions, we will stop asking you questions.
Contact Information:
You will receive a copy of this consent form. If you have questions you can
talk to or write the principal investigator, Tyler Charlton at
tycharlton9@me.com If you want to talk with a participant advocate other than
the investigator, you can write or call the director of our institutional review
board, Dr. OraLee Branch (email obranch@cu-portland.edu or call 503-4936390).
Concordia Student Counseling:
In the event that this study makes you experience feelings of discomfort or
irritation, Concordia has on campus counseling services. The counseling
center is located on the lower level of Centennial hall in offices 8, 9, 10, and
11. An appointment can also be made with the counseling staff by phone at
503-493-6499 ext. 1.
Your Statement of Consent:
I have read the above information. I asked questions if I had them, and my
questions were answered. I volunteer my consent for this study.
_______________________________
Participant Name

___________

_______________________________
Participant Signature

___________

_______________________________
Investigator Name

___________

_______________________________
Investigator Signature

___________

Date

Date

Date

Date

Investigator: Tyler Charlton; email: tycharlton9@me.com
c/o: Professor Reed Mueller;
Concordia University – Portland
2811 NE Holman Street
Portland, Oregon 97221
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Appendix B
Volunteer Opportunity

Concordia University wishes to provide a volunteer opportunity to all students
who participate in research activities. Concordia has instituted a program for the
assistance of the homeless community. Volunteers will assemble packages of food as
a part of this service. The service will occur at 7:00 a.m. in the Cafeteria on a
Saturday morning. We will be in contact confirming all those who have expressed a
desire to volunteer.

______

Yes, I wish to volunteer

______

No, I do not wish to volunteer
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Appendix C
Experimental Vignettes

Experimental Condition 1 (Free Will)
In the year 1964, Benjamin Libet performed a series of experiments in the
field of neuropsychology. These experiments were groundbreaking, particularly in the
field of human consciousness. Participants to one of his classic experiments had
electrodes from an electroencephalogram (EEG) taped to various places of their scalp.
The EEG measures neural activity in the cortex, which is associated with higher
cognitive processes. In addition, an oscilloscope timer was placed in front of the
volunteers. Libet would then instruct participants to perform a simple motor action,
such a flexing the wrist or pressing a button. Participants were asked to note the
position of the timer when he/she was first aware of the wish or urge to act. Pressing
the button also recorded the position of the timer. Following the collection of this
data, Libet compared the timing of brain activity with the timing of the participant’s
conscious decision to perform the simple motor activity. Results indicated that
conscious action preceded neural activity by approximately 200 milliseconds. These
results imply that humans possess free will and can exert control over their lives.
Experimental Condition 2 (Determinism)
In the year 1964, Benjamin Libet performed a series of experiments in the
field of neuropsychology. These experiments were groundbreaking particularly in the
field of human consciousness. Participants to one of his classic experiments had
electrodes from an electroencephalogram (EEG) taped to various places of their scalp.
The EEG measures neural activity in the cortex, which is associated with higher
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cognitive processes. In addition, an oscilloscope timer was placed in front of the
volunteers. Libet would then instruct participants to perform a simple motor action,
such a flexing the wrist or pressing a button. Participants were asked to note the
position of the timer when he/she was first aware of the wish or urge to act. Pressing
the button also recorded the position of the timer. Following the collection of this
data, Libet compared the timing of brain activity with the timing of the participant’s
conscious decision to perform the simple motor activity. Results indicated that neural
activity preceded conscious action by approximately 200 milliseconds. These results
imply that humans are subject to deterministic forces and are unable to exert control
over their lives.
Control Condition (Simultaneously Prove Existence of Both)
In the year 1964, Benjamin Libet performed a series of experiments in the
field of neuropsychology. These experiments were groundbreaking particularly in the
field of human consciousness. Participants to one of his classic experiments had
electrodes from an electroencephalogram (EEG) taped to various places of their scalp.
The EEG measures neural activity in the cortex, which is associated with higher
cognitive processes. In addition, an oscilloscope timer was placed in front of the
volunteers. Libet would then instruct participants to perform a simple motor action,
such a flexing the wrist or pressing a button. Participants were asked to note the
position of the timer when he/she was first aware of the wish or urge to act. Pressing
the button also recorded the position of the timer. Following the collection of this
data, Libet compared the timing of brain activity with the timing of the participant’s
conscious decision to perform the simple motor activity. Results indicated that neural
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activity and conscious action occurred simultaneously. These results imply that
humans possess free will and are subject to deterministic forces at the same time.
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